After the Franco-German armistice, the fate of the powerful French fleet — one of the foremost in the world — became an obsession for London. Were it to fall into Axis hands, the naval balance in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic would tip over. At Mers-el-Kébir, near Oran, a large part of this fleet lay at anchor.
Churchill demanded guarantees. Admiral , commanding , was charged with presenting an ultimatum to the French: to rally to the British, to make for a neutral port or the Antilles, or to scuttle. Failing that, he was to open fire — on the navy of a country that had been an ally only the day before, and whose crews were not enemies.
Somerville, loath to commit this act, had to carry it out. To open fire on the French fleet if the ultimatum was rejected, to prevent any risk of it serving the Axis. To play for time and negotiate beyond the deadline, at the risk of disobeying Churchill. Or to renounce the attack, gambling on the French word never to deliver up their ships. The stakes went beyond Oran: it was British determination to continue the war, alone, that the world was watching.
Should Somerville open fire on the French fleet, play for time, or renounce the attack?
On Churchill's orders, Somerville carried out A: the ultimatum rejected, opened fire on the French fleet on 3 July 1940. Within minutes, several ships were destroyed or damaged (the Bretagne blew up) and nearly 1,300 French sailors were killed. The tragedy of Mers-el-Kébir provoked deep resentment in France and poisoned Franco-British relations, serving Vichy propaganda. But it demonstrated to the world — and above all to the United States — Churchill's determination to pursue the war at any price, even against a former ally. It is one of the most tragic and controversial episodes of 1940.









