Manila or Bataan?

General Douglas MacArthur commands American and Philippine forces on Luzon as General Masaharu Homma's 14th Army pours ashore from Lingayen Gulf. The 80,000 hastily mobilized Philippine soldiers have collapsed on the beaches in under 48 hours, exposing the flaw in MacArthur's bet on coastal defense. Manila, the capital and the hub of all logistical supply, now lies open; a decision must be reached before Japanese armored columns cut the roads to the south.

Three paths present themselves. The old War Plan Orange, prepared years in advance for precisely this contingency, called for abandoning Manila without a fight, declaring it an open city to spare civilians, and withdrawing all forces into the Bataan Peninsula and onto the fortress island of Corregidor, where they would hold out until reinforcements arrived from Hawaii or the mainland. The alternative of defending Manila street by street could delay the enemy and protect the vast stores of food and ammunition stockpiled in the city, but at the cost of exposing 600,000 civilians to urban combat and risking the encirclement and destruction of the entire garrison. A third option exists: launch an immediate counterattack against the Lingayen beachheads and attempt to drive Homma back into the sea before his divisions can fully deploy.

The withdrawal to Bataan under WPO-3 is the only operationally coherent maneuver, yet it demands flawless coordination of columns crossing one another on congested roads, and it surrenders to the Japanese the supply depots that should have sustained the garrison for months. The counterattack is tempting but suicidal against an army that swept aside the beach defenses within hours. Defending Manila, finally, would sacrifice the city and with it any prospect of an organized resistance.