Wake: should a carrier be risked to save the garrison?
Vice Admiral inherits a shattered command. Named to lead the Pacific Fleet after Admiral 's relief in the days following , he is managing a crisis not of his making, one that presses on him from every direction. Some 1,600 miles northwest of Hawaii, the small garrison at - roughly 450 Marines and hundreds of civilians - is fighting with stunning tenacity: on 11 December, it repelled a first Japanese landing attempt, sinking 2 enemy destroyers and inflicting severe losses.
A relief force built around the carrier has been steaming toward the island for several days. But intelligence is unambiguous: Japanese carriers detached from the , the carrier strike force that hit , are operating in the area. American carriers are now a scarce resource - the , the , the : 3 ships to cover the entire Pacific Ocean. Losing one would mean facing 1942 with virtually no embarked air cover.
Pye must decide before the window closes: recall the relief force immediately and abandon to its fate, preserving the for the battles ahead; hold course and press on to despite the prospect of a confrontation with enemy carriers; or send only the 's air group to reinforce the island without committing the surface ships into such dangerous waters.
Pearl Harbor, 22 December 1941, acting commander of the Pacific Fleet: how far should the relief be pressed to save Wake?
On the evening of 22 December, Pye orders the relief force recalled when it is only a few hundred miles from . The atoll surrenders on 23 December. The decision generates profound bitterness in the Navy - officers and sailors reportedly wept on learning of the turnaround - and is sharply criticized for decades. It does, however, keep the intact for the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in 1942, where American carriers prove decisive.
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