Crimea, February 1942: the Kerch bridgehead
General commands the , born of the bridgehead seized in late December 1941 during the Kerch and Feodosia landings. In a few weeks he has pushed three full armies into the peninsula, the 44th, the 47th and the 51st, ferried across the Kerch Strait and then over the ice once the channel froze solid.
To the west, the narrow Parpach Isthmus bars the road into the Crimean interior: a bottleneck a few kilometres wide, with no flank to turn, held on entrenched positions by 's . Beyond it, Sevastopol still holds but is wearing down, and the Stavka presses Kozlov to act and loosen the grip on the fortress. The early thaw, meanwhile, fills the plain with water and mud, halts the columns and drowns the tracks under a mire that clings to every wheel.
Kozlov must decide how to use his forces: launch the offensive westward at once, through Parpach, to break toward Sevastopol despite the mud crippling his support; first consolidate the bridgehead and wait for reinforcements and passable ground; or go over to the defensive, assuming Manstein will strike first as soon as his means allow.
Kerch Peninsula, February 1942, commander of the Crimean Front: what should Kozlov do with his bridgehead to relieve Sevastopol?
Kozlov resumes the offensive on 27 February 1942 and renews it several times until 13 April, through the Parpach bottleneck. Each assault founders on the 's positions and bogs down in the mud: the gains are negligible, the losses enormous. From February to April, the loses some 230,000 men for a few kilometres. Then, on 8 May, Manstein goes on the offensive with Operation Trappenjagd: in about ten days he crushes the , takes Kerch and captures nearly 170,000 Soviet soldiers. Kozlov, held responsible for the disaster, is demoted. Sevastopol, now isolated, falls on 4 July 1942.
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T10-089