Crimea, December 1941: Manstein's dilemma

General Erich von Manstein is convinced, in late December 1941, that victory is within his grasp. After weeks of costly assaults, his divisions have breached Sevastopol's outer defences and the fall of the Soviet fortress seems only days away. A final push, he believes, is all that stands between him and the capture of the strongest stronghold on the Black Sea.

Then, on 26 December, the Soviets shatter his calculations. Amphibious forces land in strength at Kerch and, days later, at Feodosia, 250 kilometres behind his front. The bridgeheads are still fragile, but they are growing by the hour. If they are allowed to consolidate, they will sever the 11th Army's supply lines and threaten to crush it between Sevastopol's defenders and the fresh troops pouring in from the east. Manstein has too few divisions to fight at full intensity on 2 fronts simultaneously.

He must decide at once: break off the final assault on Sevastopol and wheel his units eastward to crush the Kerch bridgehead while it remains vulnerable; keep the maximum pressure on Sevastopol and gamble that the fortress will fall before the eastern threat turns fatal; or pull the 11th Army back to a continuous defensive line and abandon the offensive altogether to stabilise the Crimean front.