Curtin versus Churchill: the battle over the Pacific divisions

John Curtin receives a cable on this day that both infuriates and constrains him. Winston Churchill, without waiting for Canberra's agreement, has already ordered the convoy routes bent northward, placing the 6th and 7th divisions of the Australian Imperial Force days away from Rangoon rather than Perth. Singapore fell on 15 February: 15,000 Australians are now prisoners of the Japanese, and bombs have been falling on Darwin for four days. The threat of an enemy landing on the Australian continent is no longer theoretical.

Curtin must decide. He can demand the immediate return of the 2 divisions to Australia and face the combined fury of Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, who have both cabled Canberra urging Australia to sacrifice these troops for the defence of Rangoon — even at the risk of exposing them to certain capitulation, as at Singapore. He can instead yield to Allied pressure, accept the diversion to Burma, and trust American promises of rapid reinforcements to protect the continent. Or he can seek a compromise by routing part of the forces to Ceylon or Burma to satisfy London, while bringing the remainder home to hold the Australian coast.

Behind the military decision lies a fundamental political rupture. In December 1941, Curtin had publicly declared that Australia looked to America, free of any inhibitions or complexes. This February cable is the first real test of that line: how far is Canberra prepared to defy the imperial metropolis to protect its own territory?