Nagumo off Oahu — the third wave
Vice Admiral commands the , the 6-carrier force that has just struck the US Pacific Fleet. His first 2 waves caught by surprise on the morning of 7 December 1941: 8 battleships hit, hundreds of aircraft destroyed on the ground, and Japanese losses limited to 29 planes. The aviators return to their decks, elated.
But the essentials still stand. The base's vast fuel tanks — over 4 million barrels in the open —, the dry docks and the repair shops are untouched; these are what make a usable forward base. Above all, the American aircraft carriers, the prime targets, were absent: they are somewhere at sea, their position unknown.
The air group commander, , urges Nagumo to renew the attack and finish the installations. Nagumo must decide quickly, in a rising sea: order a 3rd wave to destroy the fuel and the shipyards, at the risk of heavier losses and a counterstrike from the missing carriers; steer south to hunt the enemy fleet; or withdraw at once toward Japan, keeping his precious striking force intact.
Off Oahu, 7 December 1941, commander of the Kidō Butai: after 2 victorious waves over Pearl Harbor, what should the carrier force do next?
Nagumo chose to withdraw. Judging the element of surprise spent, wary of the American carriers and of coastal batteries now on alert, he broke off in mid-morning and set course for Japan. It remains one of the most debated decisions of the Pacific War: the spared fuel tanks and dry docks let stay fully operational, and the intact carriers — , , — would spearhead the American response, all the way to 6 months later. Many historians judge that Nagumo turned a brilliant tactical success into a missed strategic opportunity; others note his aircraft were not armed to strike installations and the risks were real.
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