Ceylon Under Threat — Defending the Gate of the Indian Ocean

The British commander-in-chief responsible for Ceylon, in this month of February 1942, takes the measure of the disaster that has just struck the Empire. Singapore fell on 15 February, handing the Japanese tens of thousands of prisoners and the great Far Eastern naval base. The Japanese drive westward now seems unchecked, and the island of Ceylon finds itself in the front line.

Ceylon is not just one possession among others. Its ports — Colombo on the western coast and Trincomalee in the east — command the sea route to India and the Middle East, through which pass the oil, reinforcements, and vital supplies of the Allied war effort. To lose the island is to open the Indian Ocean to the carriers of the Imperial Navy and to threaten the junction between the Asian and African theatres. Yet the forces on hand are meagre: a few ageing cruisers and warships, sparse aviation, unfinished coastal defences.

Intelligence warns of a possible surprise carrier strike. The commander must settle his course without delay: concentrate fleet and aviation at Ceylon to defend the ports, at the risk of offering them as a target to a sudden attack; disperse the forces to a secret base in the Maldives, Addu Atoll, to preserve the bulk of the fleet; or give priority to the ground reinforcement of Colombo and Trincomalee, accepting that the sea will be left more exposed.