The Order to Evacuate — Gort and Dynamo
On 25 May 1940, the commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary Force, Lord Gort, faces the gravest decision of his career. The Allied front is collapsing, the Germans have reached the Channel, and the Allied plan still calls for a counter-attack towards the south to re-establish the junction with the bulk of the French forces.
Gort, for his part, judges the situation hopeless: he believes that the only chance of saving his army is to abandon the offensive towards the south and to fall back on Dunkirk to evacuate by sea. But that means abandoning his French allies, going against orders for inter-Allied coordination, and acknowledging defeat on the continent.
Gort may carry out the planned counter-attack towards the south, in accordance with the Allied plan, despite his scepticism. He may decide, on his own authority, on the withdrawal to Dunkirk with a view to evacuation. Or he may play for time, awaiting clear instructions from London. On this choice depends the survival of almost the entire British army.
Should Gort launch the counter-attack towards the south, order the withdrawal to Dunkirk, or wait for London?
Gort chooses B: on 25 May, on his own initiative, he abandons the counter-attack towards the south and redeploys his divisions to cover the withdrawal to Dunkirk, anticipating the evacuation. London approves and triggers Operation Dynamo on 26 May. The decision, taken against the inter-Allied plan and at the cost of tensions with the French, makes it possible to save the essential part of the Expeditionary Force — nearly 338,000 men evacuated in all. Variously judged (the French would see it as an abandonment), it preserves the British army and, with it, the United Kingdom's capacity to continue the war. It is one of the most consequential decisions of 1940.









