Poland and Mobilisation

In late August 1939, the imminence of the German attack is hardly in doubt any longer for the Polish command. For an army to be ready to fight, it must be mobilised in time: recalling reservists, moving up units, arming the positions. Every day of delay is paid for in lives and in ground.

But Warsaw is under strong pressure from its allies. France and the United Kingdom, which are pursuing final diplomatic démarches, fear that a visible Polish general mobilisation might be interpreted as a provocation and furnish Hitler with a pretext. They press Poland to play for time.

Marshal Rydz-Śmigły and the government face an agonising choice. Decree general mobilisation without delay, in the name of the military imperative, even at the cost of crossing the allies? Defer under Franco-British pressure, to preserve the chances of diplomacy, at the risk of falling behind? Or order a partial and discreet mobilisation, a lame compromise between the two? Each hour lost or gained in this race against the clock could be measured, when the moment comes, in territories and in lives.