In the summer of 1940, the fall of France and the isolation of the United Kingdom confronted American President with a weighty choice. American public opinion was largely isolationist, marked by the memory of 1917–1918, and neutrality laws strictly regulated all aid to belligerents. Yet a total German victory would, in time, threaten the security of the United States.
Roosevelt had to weigh electoral caution (he was seeking a third term in November 1940) against strategic necessity. To give material aid to the United Kingdom (weapons, ships) despite public opinion and the neutrality laws, in order to prevent a British collapse. To remain strictly neutral, so as not to offend opinion or risk drawing the country into the war. Or to confine himself to declarations of support without concrete material commitment.
Churchill multiplied his appeals for help. The question was whether the "great democracy" across the Atlantic would let the last European bulwark against Hitler fall, or whether it would become, as Roosevelt wished, the "arsenal of democracy".
Should Roosevelt arm the United Kingdom, remain strictly neutral, or confine himself to declarations of support?
Roosevelt moved towards A, cautiously but resolutely: while affirming his wish to keep the United States out of the war, he denounced as early as 10 June 1940 Italy's "stab in the back" and committed to growing aid to the United Kingdom. In September 1940, the "destroyers-for-bases" agreement delivered fifty old American destroyers to the Royal Navy; 1941 would bring Lend-Lease, making the United States the "arsenal of democracy". This material support, at first limited by isolationism and electoral constraints, was vital to British survival. Roosevelt's choice in 1940 set in motion the gradual tilting of the United States towards engagement, which would become total after Pearl Harbor (December 1941).









