The RAF — Fighters or Bombers

For years, the dominant doctrine of the Royal Air Force has bet on the bomber: faced with an air attack, the best defence would be a bombing force capable of striking the enemy in reprisal — deterrence through mutual terror. This conviction has steered budgets and production towards bomber squadrons.

But in the late 1930s, another school gains ground, carried by Fighter Command and by officials anxious to defend British skies first. Modern monoplane fighters — the Hurricane, then the Spitfire — and the radar network make an active defence of the homeland credible.

In the summer of 1939, the aircraft industry, under strain, cannot produce everything at once. The priority must be arbitrated. To concentrate the effort on fighters and the defence of the homeland, at the risk of weakening offensive capability? To maintain priority on bombers, faithful to the doctrine of deterrence, at the risk of leaving the cities poorly protected? Or to divide the effort equally, without deciding? The choice will determine the shape of the RAF at the moment of impact.