Roosevelt and the Japanese assets

The Japanese occupation of southern Indochina, at the end of July 1941, places the Japanese bases within reach of Malaya, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. In Washington, it is the red line: Roosevelt and his administration regard this advance as a direct threat to Western interests and to the sources of raw materials of the Pacific.

The United States holds a powerful lever: it supplies the bulk of the oil and scrap iron on which the Japanese war machine depends. But to use it carries a major risk. A total oil embargo would corner Japan — either to back down, or to throw itself by force on the oil fields of the South, triggering war. Japan's crude reserves cover scarcely more than two years in wartime, and the country imports from the United States nearly four-fifths of its oil.

Roosevelt must calibrate the riposte: confine himself to diplomatic protests; freeze Japanese assets and restrict exports, an intermediate measure but one that may slide toward a total embargo; or decree from the outset a complete oil embargo, at the assumed risk of war. The dosage of American pressure will determine the trajectory toward the Pacific.