Kanne bridge — fourth airborne target
Lieutenant guarded the Kanne bridge on the Albert Canal with around thirty men of the . Kanne was the southernmost of the four German airborne targets that morning, some two and a half miles north of Fort Eben-Emael. Like his comrades at Vroenhoven and Veldwezelt, Rohling had orders to destroy his bridge the moment the enemy appeared; the charges were in place under the deck.
At dawn on 10 May, Rohling had an advantage the other defenders did not: distance. The gliders of the came down on Eben-Emael at 04:25, and the rumble of the first explosions carried as far as his position before his own attackers — the , about 90 paratroopers in gliders — were upon him. For the first time that morning, a bridge guard heard the attack coming.
Rohling had to read that distant uproar. Was it the signal of a general attack that concerned him too, or an isolated event at the neighbouring fort? His hand was on the firing key; the enemy was not yet visible on his deck.
Should he blow Kanne on the strength of the Eben-Emael explosions, without waiting to see the enemy?
Rohling applied A: he fired the charges at the sound of Eben-Emael, without waiting to see his attackers. The Kanne bridge blew up a fraction of a second before the first paratroopers of the reached the deck — the blast wave threw gliders into the air. Kanne was the only one of the four bridges targeted that morning to be destroyed before the assault: Vroenhoven, Veldwezelt and the roof of Eben-Emael fell intact or were neutralised. The immediately suffered eight killed and several wounded, and missed its objective. Locally, the demolition delayed the , which had to use the neighbouring bridges left intact; on the scale of the campaign, the respite remained modest. Rohling, taken prisoner, was released in 1945 and died in 1962. His reaction is taught as a textbook case of rapid decision under surprise attack.









