Rommel at El Agheila — orders or audacity?

Having arrived in Tripoli in February, Rommel had been given a strictly defensive mission: hold Tripolitania, without attacking before the arrival of all his forces, expected in May. His German and Italian superiors had expressly forbidden any offensive. But the general observed before him a weakened adversary: the British had halted their advance at El Agheila, and above all diverted their best units — Australians, seasoned armour — to Greece, leaving in Cyrenaica only a reduced and inexperienced garrison.

Rommel noted the enemy's weakness. An offensive reconnaissance showed him that the British position at El Agheila was lightly held; he took it on 24 March without difficulty. Beyond stretched Cyrenaica, which the British had just wrested from the Italians.

The choice was clear and heavy with insubordination: respect orders and wait for May with all his forces; push a limited advance to improve his positions; or launch at once, with only the available elements and in defiance of instructions, a deep offensive to exploit the enemy's momentary weakness, betting on speed and audacity.