Tokyo, 5 November 1941: the last council

Admiral Nagano Osami had headed the Naval General Staff of the Imperial Japanese Navy since April 1941, and within the high command he carried the fleet's voice in the decisive arbitrations of the autumn. Trained in classical naval doctrine, he grasped the stakes better than most: the American oil embargo was strangling reserves estimated at roughly two years' consumption, and every passing month ate into the margin.

The imperial conference of 6 September had already set a timetable; it had lapsed without result. In Washington, the talks led by Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura with Secretary of State Cordell Hull stalled on a point nothing could untangle: the evacuation of China, demanded by the United States.

For the high command, time now worked against Japan. The season favorable to operations in the Pacific was closing, and diplomacy and the military clock were running in opposite directions.

On 5 November, Emperor Hirohito presided over the gozen kaigi ("conference in the imperial presence"). The document submitted tied the opening of hostilities to the failure of the talks before a fixed deadline. Nagano had to choose the fleet's line: to prolong the negotiations with no ultimatum or attack timetable; to yield to the American conditions, including withdrawal from China; or to back entry into war with a deadline should no agreement be signed by the end of November.